More to the Iranian Nuclear Story
Following the U.S. strike that killed Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force, Iran announced that it will no longer abide by the uranium restrictions contained in the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and major world powers. This announcement has naturally generated much discussion and commentary, most of which has rightfully focused on how increasing uranium enrichment will advance the timeline for Iranian capability to build a nuclear bomb. This so-called “break-out” period is the amount of time it would take for Iran to produce enough highly enriched uranium to construct a nuclear device. According to the Institute for Science and International Security, it could take Iran as little as four to five months to construct a nuclear device once they make this decision.
While the idea of Iran having a nuclear bomb fitting to a ballistic missile is disconcerting, Iran’s recent announcement is troubling for other reasons. Iran’s wide proxy terrorist network poses significant proliferation risks. Even if Iran is not able to build a nuclear device capable of fitting to a ballistic missile, more crude nuclear materials could be dangerous in the hands of these terrorist groups.
Accelerated Iranian nuclear activity could also affect the behavior of other regional powers. For example, Saudi Arabia has been the object of Iranian aggression for decades. This includes the plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States in 2011, ongoing Iranian support of Huthi rebel attacks on Saudi forces in Yemen, and the most recent missile and drone attack on a Saudi Arabian oil processing facility.
For these reasons, the international community should worry about how long Saudi Arabia would be content to remain a nuclear weapons-free state if Saudi leaders fear that Iran’s “breakout period” shrinks or disappears. At first, Saudi nuclear ambitions may not seem like a near-term concern. But given the nation’s financial resources and recently established nuclear power program, it is not far-fetched to imagine Saudi Arabia seeking to counter Iran’s perceived nuclear capabilities, much like Japan has warned after threats from North Korea. Without question, the spread of nuclear weapons through the most turbulent region of the world should concern all countries who still see value in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Increased Iranian nuclear capabilities pose other significant security concerns. Iran is the world’s most dangerous state sponsor of terrorism. According to a new State Department report, it continues to provide significant support, in excess of one billion dollars, to terrorist organizations not only in the Middle East but also throughout Europe. This support includes providing advanced military technology to Hezbollah, the world’s most heavily armed non-state actor with a large and diverse stockpile of rockets and missiles.
If Iran advances in its efforts to produce weapon-usable uranium, the risk rises of proliferation (perhaps of a crude nuclear device) to proxy terrorist organizations. Iran might feel motivated to undertake such a high-risk course of action for a host of reasons. For example, Iran might want a perceived “insurance policy” against a preemptive attack on Iranian nuclear facilities by Israel or the U.S. Indeed, Iran may have learned a dangerous lesson from North Korea; even before North Korea tested its first nuclear bomb, western powers were hesitant to attack facilities due to uncertainty regarding the reach of North Korea’s nuclear program and possibility for retaliation.
Some may argue that Tehran would never allow a proxy to have control over such an important strategic weapon or technology. If a proxy were to use such a technology, it would surely be attributed to Iran-leaving the country open to massive retaliation. Although, such an argument ignores the possibility that if an extremist terrorist organization such as Hezbollah were given the chance to detonate a nuclear device against Israel or the U.S., it might do so even without the permission of its Iranian sponsors. Moreover, with the U.S. killing of Gen. Soleimani (who had a strong following from proxy groups like Hezbollah) all bets may be off. Soleimani was an inspiration to followers throughout Iran’s sphere of influence and oversaw the vast web of proxy forces Iran has spent years establishing.
Playing the long game, devotees of Soleimani could bide their time to strike the U.S. or U.S. interest in retaliation for the death of their “living”, now true, martyr with the detonation of a nuclear device. Given Hezbollah’s history of involvement in Latin America, the threat to the United States homeland may be greater than many appreciate or would like to admit. For these reasons, it is more important than ever for the United States to take policy measures to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Originally published at https://www.e3federal.com on January 31, 2020.
