Southeast Asia Nuclear Terrorism and Proliferation Concerns
When you turn on the news, whether it is the radio, online or television, we are inundated with updates on the impeachment proceedings. Not only are we becoming distracted, our leadership in the United States is becoming distracted. The United States, however, must not forget about the threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. While it may seem unlikely for any country within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to consider developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Southeast Asian proliferation risks are growing as ASEAN members seek alternate nuclear fuel sources to support their growing economies. The risk to the U.S. and the world is real, especially considering Southeast Asia’s strategic position as a shipping and transit corridor.
The interest in nuclear power in Southeast Asia reflects a growing demand for energy as well as concern over the economic and environmental impact of other fuel sources such as coal and hydropower dams. Vietnam in particular has experienced rapid economic growth and its energy demand is forecasted to grow eight percent annually until 2035, according to the Vietnam Energy Outlook Report 2017. The report, released by the Vietnamese government in collaboration with the Danish Energy Agency, states that the Southeast Asia’s overall energy demand is set to grow by 60 percent between now and 2040, nearly double the global average. With ASEAN member states, Vietnam, Philippines and Indonesia flirting with the idea of establishing civilian nuclear power programs, the international community should take pause. Beyond the safety and security concerns, nuclear technologies pose proliferation risks and because of their dual-use nature, require policies and procedures to prevent theft and illicit trade.
The proliferation risks associated with Southeast Asia stem in part from the “ASEAN way” of non-interference and a resentment of export controls, viewing them as barriers to economic development. According to NTI, Indonesia in particular is skeptical of multilateral export control regimes, viewing them as impeding the flow of technology to the developing world. As countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia and Philippines begin developing nuclear power, we should pay close attention to their capacity and desire to develop fissile material production capabilities such as uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing. This would give them the ability to produce weapons-usable nuclear materials, heightening the risks to proliferation or theft. Some countries have promised to forgo such capabilities while others such as Vietnam have left the question open. Fissile nuclear material and the associated technologies are prime proliferation risks. While countries cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may sign agreements to control exports, enforcement of these controls is paramount and ASEAN countries have a weak enforcement record.
The challenges within some ASEAN countries to safely manage public infrastructure heighten the risk posed by terrorists and insurgents desiring to target nuclear power reactors or attempt to obtain nuclear material. There is no shortage of violent militant groups operating in the region — including Muslim separatists in the southern Philippines, Aceh in Indonesia, and the southern provinces of Thailand. Additionally, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has proven to be a serious threat to the security of the region, especially in Indonesia, according to a report by The Diplomat. Terrorist have also focused their attention on the region’s nuclear research reactors and future nuclear power plants as potential for acquiring nuclear and radioactive materials. Reports reveal the involvement of key individuals from Southeast Asia in the nuclear black market and in Al Qaeda’s attempts to acquire WMD materials and expertise from Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia’s geography and role in the global economy also render it highly vulnerable to maritime terrorist attacks. Southeast Asia continues to serve as a critical shipping and transshipment connector with a significant portion of world trade and oil supply transiting through the Malacca Strait, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. The Strait has chokepoints congested with hundreds of cargo ships slowly navigating narrow and shallow channels on a daily basis. Based on the number of ships operating in the region, a terrorist organization obtaining nuclear or radiological material, or some other kind of WMD, would find it relatively simple to conduct an attack in those channels.
An even bigger threat that could cause catastrophic economic damage would be from the detonation of a “dirty” bomb somewhere in the global supply chain. A dirty bomb, which is a conventional bomb configured to disperse radioactive material, could be smuggled in through a container ship that comes through a busy Southeast Asian port. If a dirty bomb reached a U.S. port, even if it didn’t cause mass casualties, the economic consequences would be enormous. According to Joshua Ho’s The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia, the global economic impact from a port closure could easily exceed U.S. $200 billion per year from disruptions to inventory and production cycles. Experts have estimated that a radioactive dirty bomb detonation at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach could cause roughly $34 billion in damages to the U.S. economy not the mention major psychological consequences, according to the Los Angeles Times.
Of course, through post-9/11 security enhancements like the Container Security Initiative and the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, the U.S. has significantly improved our ability to ensure that potentially high-risk containers are identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United States. But even a failed dirty bomb attack that was thwarted at an overseas port would undoubtedly do significant economic damage to our fragile international system of trade. Inspections overseas and at U.S. ports would increase, port employees would demand greater protections against radiological exposure, and the flow of legitimate trade through our ports would slow — threatening the “just in time” delivery model that our economy increasingly relies on. For example, a 2012 strike by 500 clerical workers at the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach idled 10 of the ports’ combined 14 container terminals when 10,000 union longshoremen refused to cross the picket lines, and was estimated to cost our economy $1 billion per day. An unsuccessful dirty bomb attack using a shipping container would cause even more disruption, and at greater cost.
For these reasons, the U.S. must continue to strengthen security initiatives around the globe such as the Container Security Initiative. The U.S. should also place renewed emphasis convincing countries such as Indonesia and China to join the Proliferation Security Initiative as proliferation prevention is only as strong as the weakest link in the global supply chain.
Originally published at https://www.e3federal.com on November 30, 2019.
